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Non-technical summary
This paper addresses the outcome of international tax competition in the presence of
multinationals that use transfer pricing for strategic purposes as well as to reduce
their tax burden. In particular we examine how economic integration affects tax
levels, transfer pricing behaviour and national welfare under different corporate
taxation regimes.
It is well known in the literature on multinationals that firms may use transfer pricing
as a strategic device to increase profits in foreign markets. To see the strategic
motive for transfer pricing consider a multinational enterprise (MNE) that has a
foreign subsidiary which is active in markets with Cournot competition. Essential
intermediates are supplied by the headquarter to the foreign affiliate. If the MNE sets
low prices, the foreign affiliate becomes a low-cost firm that behaves aggressively by
selling a large quantity. Such aggressive behavior under Cournot competition
induces its local rival to behave softly by setting a low quantity. The soft response
from the rival is beneficial and leads to higher profits in the foreign market as well as
to increased profits for the multinational enterprise as a whole.
It is also well known from the literature that MNEs may use transfer pricing as a
means to shifting profits to low-tax countries. From a policy point of view transfer
pricing to shift profits to low tax countries is worrisome, since the profit shifting
activities threaten to undermine the fiscal autonomy of high tax countries. At least two
policy options exist to curb transfer pricing. The first measure is to enforce arm's
length prices on intra-firm transactions. Not only is this difficult to achieve, but the
administrative costs are also considerable. The second solution pertains to the
choice of tax system. If, by choosing the ''right'' system for corporate taxation, one
can reduce the disparities in countries' tax bases and tax rates, incentives to shift
profits would be diminished. Currently, most OECD countries use separate
accounting as a foundation for their corporate tax system. Under this system
accountants and tax authorities try to identify the exact receipts and expenditures
attributable to the corporation's activities in each country. A problem with the
separate accounting system is that the globalization of the world economy has made
it ever more difficult to disentangle individual operations of multinational corporations.
The alternative corporate tax system is formula apportionment, where the total
income of a corporation is apportioned on the basis of a weighted formula, where the
weights are, say, sales, payroll or property. Variants of formula apportionments are
used in Canada, Switzerland and the US.
In our analysis we explore the interaction between corporate taxation, transfer pricing
and welfare. We show that the relationship between these factors depends on
degree of economic integration and the choice of tax regime.
We show that the transfer price of a multinational is actually independent of the
prevailing tax regime, separate accounting or formula apportionment. Nonetheless,
the tax elasticity of the transfer price depends on the tax system and on the extent of
economic integration.One important result that emerges is that the effect of increased
economic integration on equilibrium taxes depends crucially on the tax regime in
force. We show that the transfer price is relatively tax elastic for a high degree of
economic integration under a separate accounting regime, while the opposite is true
under a formula apportionment regime. As a consequence, the impact of economic
integration on welfare and on the intensity of tax competition depends crucially on the
choice of tax scheme. While under SA increased economic integration leads to lower
tax revenue, the opposite is true under FA.
To make a full welfare assessment it should be noted that economic integration
under any tax regime affects consumer surplus positively due to enhanced
competition leading to lower prices and larger quantities sold. Thus, under SA we
have two opposing effects of increased integration; rising consumer surplus and
falling tax rates. In contrast, with FA, consumer surplus and tax rates rise. Figure 4
indicates that an SA regime provides the highest welfare level for a low degree of
integration (high trade costs), while the FA regime becomes more attractive as
integration proceeds. Thus, for a high degree of economic integration, the FA regime
may come to dominate the SA regime from a welfare perspective.
We find that the impact of increased economic integration on the intensity of
international tax competition hinges on the choice of tax regime. Under Separate
accounting increased integration leads to intensified tax competition, while under
Formula apportionment increased integration actually reduces the intensity of tax
competition. These relationships are mirrored in the relationship between economic
integration and welfare under the two different tax regimes. In terms of national
welfare, the SA system dominates for low degrees of integration, while the FA system
becomes dominating as an integration process proceeds. Hence, our results support
the view brought forward by many other economists that increased economic
integration may call for a substantial reform of the corporate tax system.
1 Introduction
It is well known in the literature on multinationals that …rms may use transfer pricing
as a strategic device to increase pro…ts in foreign markets.1 To see the strategic
motive for transfer pricing consider a multinational enterprise (MNE) that has a
foreign subsidiary which is active in markets with Cournot competition. Essential
intermediates are supplied by the headquarter to the foreign a¢liate. If the MNE sets
low prices, the foreign a¢liate becomes a low-cost …rm that behaves aggressively by
selling a large quantity. Such aggressive behavior under Cournot competition induces
its local rival to behave softly by setting a low quantity. The soft response from the
rival is bene…cial and leads to higher pro…ts in the foreign market as well as to
increased pro…ts for the multinational enterprise as a whole.
It is also well known from the literature that MNEs may use transfer pricing as a
means to shifting pro…ts to low-tax countries.2 From a policy point of view transfer
pricing to shift pro…ts to low tax countries is worrisome, since the pro…t shifting
activities threaten to undermine the …scal autonomy of high tax countries. At least
two policy options exist to curb transfer pricing. The …rst measure is to enforce arm’s
length prices on intra-…rm transactions. Not only is this di¢cult to achieve, but the
administrative costs are also considerable. The second solution pertains to the choice
of tax system. If, by choosing the ”right” system for corporate taxation, one can
reduce the disparities in countries’ tax bases and tax rates, incentives to shift pro…ts
would be diminished. Currently, most OECD countries use separate accounting as
a foundation for their corporate tax system. Under this system accountants and
tax authorities try to identify the exact receipts and expenditures attributable to
the corporation’s activities in each country. A problem with the separate accounting
system is that the globalization of the world economy has made it ever more di¢cult
to disentangle individual operations of multinational corporations. The alternative
corporate tax system is formula apportionment, where the total income of a corpo-
ration is apportioned on the basis of a weighted formula, where the weights are, say,
sales, payroll or property. Variants of formula apportionments are used in Canada,
1See e.g.Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997) and Gabrielsen and Schjelderup (1999).
2See e.g. Horst (1971), Kant (1990).
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Switzerland and the US.
This paper addresses the outcome of international tax competition in the pres-
ence of multinationals that may use transfer pricing both for strategic purposes as
well as to reduce their tax burden. A central element of our analysis is the interaction
between economic integration and international tax competition, and we examine
how economic integration a¤ects tax levels, transfer pricing behavior and national
welfare. We show that the transfer price of a multinational is actually indepen-
dent of the prevailing tax regime, separate accounting or formula apportionment.
Nonetheless, the tax elasticity of the transfer price depends on the tax system and
on the extent of economic integration. In particular, we show that the transfer price
is relatively tax elastic for a high degree of economic integration under a separate
accounting regime, while the opposite is true under a formula apportionment regime.
As a consequence, the impact of economic integration on welfare and on the inten-
sity of tax competition depends crucially on the choice of tax scheme – formula
apportionment or separate accounting. Under separate accounting the conventional
wisdom that increased economic integration forces government to reduce tax rates
is supported by our …ndings. However, this is not true under formula apportion-
ment, where increased integration reduces the tax elasticity of the transfer prices
and indeed allows governments to levy higher tax rates.
2 The model
We consider two symmetric countries, labelled country h (home) and f (foreign).
There is a …xed number nh = nf of enterprises in the country, and each enterprise
is a multinational …rm with a foreign subsidiary. For simplicity we will assume that
the …rms produce homogenous goods, but this has no qualitative implications for
our results. The inverse demand functions faced by the …rms are given by
pii = ®¡
·X
ni
xii +
X
nj
xji
¸
, (1)
pij = ®¡
·X
ni
xij +
X
nj
xjj
¸
; (2)
where x is quantity and p price. The …rst subscript denotes producer country and
the second subscript consumer country, e.g., pij is the price of a good produced in
2
country i and consumed in country j:
We de…ne pro…ts before tax for enterprise k in country i as ¼ki = ¼
k
ii+¼
k
ij; where ¼
k
ii
is the pro…t level of the parent …rm and ¼kij is the pro…t level of the foreign subsidiary
(subscript i denotes localization of headquarters while subscript j indicates physical
location of the plant). All …rms producing in country i are identical and have the
same real unit production costs ci: To simplify, we assume that ci = cj = 0:3 The
foreign a¢liate of …rm k is charged gki when it purchases a good from the parent
…rm in country i: A positive gki implies that the transfer price is higher than the
marginal cost of production, while a negative gki signi…es underinvoicing.
Each multinational delegates decisions about prices and quantities in national
markets to its a¢liates in these markets, while the headquarter sets the transfer
price. Pro…ts before tax for the parent …rm and the foreign a¢liate are respectively
¼kii = piix
k
ii + g
k
i xij ¡ C(gi) and ¼kij = (pij ¡ gki ¡ ¿)xkij; (3)
where ¿ denotes trade costs and C(gi) are concealment costs of transfer pricing.
It is assumed that the true cost of exporting cannot be directly observed by tax
authorities, so gi becomes an additional choice variable for the multinational …rm,
which is determined by the headquarters of each multinational. In line with most of
the literature on transfer pricing we make the realistic assumption that it is costly
to conceal deviations in the transfer price from the true costs of exporting. This
means that the concealment costs are a convex function of the di¤erence between
the declared and the true price of the exported good.4 Hence, the concealment cost
function has the following properties
C(0) = C 0(0) = 0; sign(C 0) = sign(gi); C 00(gi) > 0:
Separate Accounting (SA)
3It can be shown that this simpli…cation does not a¤ect results qualitatively.
4This assumption can be interpreted either as an increased probability of detection by the tax
authorities (see, e.g. Kant, 1988) or as costs that need to be incurred in order to conceal the
true price of the product for example by hiring of lawyers and accountants (see, e.g., Hau‡er and
Schjelderup, 2000).
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Under the SA method of taxation each country imposes a tax on the pro…ts
generated within its borders. Although in principle repatriated pro…ts are taxed in
the country of residence, there is general agreement that due to deferral possibilities
and limited tax credit rules, the source principle of taxation is e¤ectively in operation
(Keen, 1993, and Tanzi and Bovenberg, 1990). Taking this into account, global after
tax pro…ts for a multinational …rm located in country i and with a foreign a¢liate
in country j are given by
¼SAi = (1¡ ti) ¼ii + (1¡ tj) ¼ij (4)
Formula Apportionment (FA)
Under the FA scheme the tax liability is apportioned to each country based on the
activities of the MNE in each country relative to the MNE’s world-wide activities.5
The activity measure used in this model is sales in each country, and after tax pro…ts
for a multinational …rm located in country i and with a foreign a¢liate in country
j are given by
¼FAi = (1¡ ti)
µ
xii
xii + xij
¶
¼Gi + (1¡ tj)
µ
xij
xii + xij
¶
¼Gi ; (5)
where ¼Gi = ¼ii + ¼ij denotes global pro…ts before tax.
The Game
In the following we study a three-stage game under separate accounting and
formula apportionment respectively. The game leads to endogenous determination
of tax rates and transfer prices, and the action by each government is observable in
subsequent stages. The structure of the game is as follows:
First stage: Governments choose tax rates simultaneously.
Second stage: The headquarters of multinationals set the transfer price.
5The FA system is currently used in the US, Canada, and Switzerland.
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Third stage: Quantity competition between plants in each country.
Solving the game backwards, we start by the third stage, which is independent
of the tax system.
Stage 3: Quantity competition between plants in each country
Domestic and foreign plants maximize their pro…t with respect to quantities, and
the …rst order conditions are given by
@¼ii=@xii = 0 ) xkii = pii, (6)
@¼ij=@xij = 0 ) xkij = (pij ¡ gki ¡ ¿):
Letting gi and gj denote the average transfer prices used by other …rms than k, we
have
pii =
®+ nj(gj + ¿)
1 + ni + nj
, (7)
pij =
®+ ni(gi + ¿) + (g
k
i ¡ gi)
1 + ni + nj
:
By combining equations (6) and (7) we can write the equilibrium quantities,
which are the outcomes of the third stage, as
xii =
®+ nj(¿ + gj)
1 + ni + nj
; (8)
xij =
®¡ (1 + nj)¿ ¡ (ni + nj) gki + (ni ¡ 1) gi
1 + ni + nj
:
Using (7) we derive the partial e¤ects for a given enterprise of increasing its
transfer price. A change in the transfer price of a …rm k does not a¤ect the prices in
the domestic market (@pii=@gki = @pji=@g
k
i = 0). However, an increase in the transfer
price leads to an increase in the price faced by the a¢liate and its local competitors
in the foreign market:
@pij=@g
k
i = @pjj=@g
k
i =
1
1 + ni + nj
; (9)
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As for the impacts of transfer pricing on quantities, these are derived from (8), and
summarized in (10):
@xkii=@g
k
i = @x
k
ji=@g
k
i = 0
@xkij=@g
k
i = ¡
µ
ni + nj
1 + ni + nj
¶
´ ¡¸ (10)
@xkjj=@g
k
i =
1
1 + ni + nj
:
Again we see that the transfer price does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome in the
country of the parent …rm, but impacts on the quantities sold by the a¢liate and its
local competitors. An increased transfer price decreases the a¢liate’s market share;
if the transfer price increases by one unit, the foreign a¢liate sells ¸ units less.
Turning to stages 2 and 1, we consider the outcomes under Separate Accounting
(SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA) separately. We start by investigating transfer
pricing and optimal tax rates under SA.
3 Transfer pricing and non-cooperative tax policy
under SA
At stage 2 the central authority within the multinational …rm determines how the
transfer price should optimally be set, taking the tax rates as given.
Stage 2: The headquarters set transfer prices
The global after tax pro…ts of a multinational are equal to
¼k;SAi = (1¡ ti) ¼kii + (1¡ tj) ¼kij; (11)
The problem of the headquarter is to maximize (11) subject to (7) and (8), and this
yields the …rst order condition
@¼k;SAi
@gki
= (1¡ ti)
¡
xkij ¡ ¸gki ¡ C 0
¢¡ (1¡ tj) 2¸xkij = 0; (12)
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where we have used (6) to substitute for xkij in deriving the …rst order condition:
Solving equation (12) we can express the transfer price as
gi =
(xij ¡ C 0) (1¡ ti)¡ 2¸xij (1¡ tj)
(1¡ ti)¸ ; (13)
where we have dropped the superscripts k due to the symmetry between the …rms.
From (13) we see that if the countries levy the same tax rates (ti = tj) – which they
will do in equilibrium due to symmetry – equation (13) reduces to
gi = ¡(2n¡ 1)xij + (1 + 2n)C
0
2n
< 0 (14)
As seen from (14) the transfer price is negative. The reason is that a low transfer
price turns the foreign a¢liate into a low cost …rm that behaves aggressively by
increasing its sales in the foreign market. The response of the competing …rms in
the foreign market is to scale down their sales thus allowing the foreign a¢liate to
capture a larger share of the market. This is pro…table for the foreign subsidiary as
well as for the multinational as a whole.
From (13) we see that in the general case, the transfer price will be negative if
the domestic tax rate is higher than the tax rate abroad. In this case both tax and
strategic considerations dictate a low transfer price. However, equation (13) shows
that the tax incentive works in the opposite direction of the strategic incentive if
the tax rate abroad is higher than the domestic rate. With a signi…cant gap in tax
rates between domestic and foreign tax rates, it is thus possible that multinationals
with headquarters in the low-tax country will set a positive transfer price.
A central element of the analysis that follows is the degree of economic integra-
tion, and how increased integration a¤ects equilibrium transfer prices and tax rates.
Using (13) together with (10) and (9), yields
dgi
d¿
=
·
1¡ 2n
2n+ (1 + 2n)C 00
¸
dxij
d¿
(15)
and
dxij
d¿
= ¡ 1 + n
1 + 2n
¡ 2n
1 + 2n
dgi
d¿
< 0: (16)
7
Equation (16) in combination with equation (6) illustrates that the pro…t margin
(pij¡gi¡¿) = xij of the foreign subsidiary falls if trade costs increase thus reducing
the sales of the enterprise abroad. Using (15) and (16) we further …nd that
dgi
d¿
=
(2n¡ 1) (1 + n)
4n+ (1 + 2n)2C 00i
> 0; (17)
which shows that the transfer price is an increasing function of the level of trade
costs. The reason is that it becomes more expensive to export and therefore less
pro…table to use the transfer price as a strategic device to win market shares abroad
the higher the level of trade costs. Since the two countries are symmetric, it follows
that they will set the same tax rate in equilibrium.6 Hence, equation (14) applies,
and the relationship between trade costs and the transfer price is as illustrated in
Figure 1 (see appendix for parameter values).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium transfer prices.
Stage 1: The optimal choice of tax rates
At the …rst stage each government sets the tax rate in order to maximize national
welfare, taking the taxes of the other country as given. For simplicity, we assume
that the multinational …rms are owned by third country residents so welfare equals
6See e.g., Zodrow and Miezskowski (1986); Wildasin (1988); Bucovetsky and Wilson, (1991) for
an elaboration of the symmetry result in the tax competition literature.
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the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and tax income (TR), which respectively are
given by :7
CSi =
1
2
[ni(®¡ pii)xii + nj(®¡ pji)xji] ; (18)
and
TRSAi = ti(nipiixii + nigixij ¡ niCi + nj¼ji): (19)
The problem of the government is thus to maximize
W SAi = max
ti
©
CSi + TR
SA
i
ª
; (20)
subject to (12). It is not possible to derive explicit analytical expressions to this
problem. However, we are able to …nd the qualitative relationship between taxes
and trade costs, since equilibrium taxes are restricted by how sensitive the transfer
price is to tax changes. Other things being equal, a low sensitivity allows high taxes,
while a high sensitivity requires low taxes. In order to derive how the transfer price
is a¤ected by changes in tax rates we use equation (12) together with (9) and (10),
and …nd (see derivation in the Appendix):
@gi
@ti
= ¡4nxij 1 + 2n
(1¡ t) £(1 + 2n)2C 00 + 4n¤ < 0 (21)
and
@gi
@tj
= 4nxij
1 + 2n
(1¡ t) £(1 + 2n)2C 00 + 4n¤ > 0; (22)
where t is the common tax rate.
The sign of equations (21) and (22) shows that an increase in the domestic
(foreign) tax rate increases (decreases) the transfer price since it becomes more
(less) pro…table to shift pro…ts abroad. Since xij is decreasing in ¿ we can also pose
the following proposition:
7Excluding producer surplus from the welfare function does not a¤ect the main conclusions of
the analysis. An early version of this paper showing this is available upon request from the authors.
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PROPOSITION 1: Under Separate Accounting, other things being equal,
transfer prices are more tax sensitive the lower the level of trade costs.
From equations (6) and (16) it is seen that the pro…t margin of the foreign
a¢liate (pij ¡ gi ¡ ¿ = xij) is decreasing in the level of trade costs. Hence, as trade
costs fall, it becomes more pro…table to use the transfer price to shift pro…ts. A
change in either tax rate will therefore lead to a larger response in the transfer price
the greater the pro…t margin.8 A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that as trade
costs are reduced, the tax base of each country becomes more vulnerable to pro…t
shifting. Thus;
PROPOSITION 2: Under Separate Accounting, other things being equal, equi-
librium tax rates are lower the lower the level of trade costs.
Proposition 2 is parallel to the results found in the tax competition literature.9
Lower trade costs increase the mobility of the tax base and make it more attractive
for each country to lower its tax rate. In doing so each country neglects the …scal
externality that arises from a change in the tax rate. Hence, tax rates will fall as
economic integration proceeds (and will be too low in the tax equilibrium compared
to the outcome under coordination). Proposition 2 is illustrated by the upward-
sloping tax curve in Figure 2, which is found by solving (20) numerically.
8Note also that gi must be equal to zero if trade is prohibitively expensive, i.e., if pij ¡ ¿ · 0:
More generally, underinvoicing can never be optimal, unless the export pro…t margin (pij ¡ gi¡ ¿)
is strictly positive.
9See Wildasin (1988).
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Figure 2: Equilibrium tax rates under Separate Accounting.
4 Transfer pricing and non-cooperative tax policy
under FA
Just as under an SA regime the central authority within the multinational …rm
determines at stage 2 how the transfer price should optimally be set. In doing so it
takes the tax rates as given.
Stage 2: The headquarters set transfer prices
At the second stage …rm k0s maximization problem is given by
¼k;FAi = max
gki
(
(1¡ ti)
Ã
xkii
xkii + x
k
ij
!
¼k;Gi + (1¡ tj)
Ã
xkij
xkii + x
k
ij
!
¼k;Gi
)
; (23)
where ¼k;G = ¼kii + ¼
k
ij ; c.f. equation (3), and the quantities are given by equation
(8). It is now useful to de…ne
Áki ´
@
¡@gki
Ã
xkij
xkii + x
k
ij
!
=
xkii
(xkii + x
k
ij)
2
Ã
@xkij
¡@gki
!
; (24)
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The variable Áki measures by how much the foreign subsidiary’s share of total sales,
xkij=(x
k
ii+x
k
ij), increases if the transfer price g
k
i is reduced by one unit.
10 From equa-
tion (10) we know that by reducing gki by one unit the …rm will sell @x
k
ij=
¡¡@gki ¢ = ¸
units more abroad. The resulting increase in the foreign subsidiary’s share of total
sales is thus obviously higher the smaller the initial value of xkij. Since the export
quantity xkij is decreasing in ¿ it follows that
@Ái=@¿ > 0;
where we have omitted the superscript k since …rms are symmetric. Inserting for
@xkij=
¡¡@gki ¢ into (24) we have that
Ái =
xii¸
(xii + xij)2
: (25)
Since corporate taxation under FA divides pro…ts between locations according to the
share of sales, the variable Ái identi…es the extent to which transfer pricing allows for
pro…t shifting across locations. The fact that Ái is increasing in ¿ will be shown to
be important when we consider the relationship between trade costs and equilibrium
taxes below.
In order to derive the optimal transfer price we maximize (23) with respect to
gi, and by inserting for (25) we …nd that
(tj ¡ ti)Ái¼Gi +
·
(1¡ ti) xii
xii + xij
+ (1¡ tj) xij
xii + xij
¸
@¼Gi
@gi
= 0 (26)
in optimum. From (3), (6), (9), and (10) it follows that
@¼Gi
@gi
= (1¡ 2¸)xij ¡ gi¸¡ C 0i: (27)
Note that (26) reduces to @¼Gi =@gi = 0 if the countries levy the same tax rate.
This will be true in equilibrium, since countries are symmetric. Inserting for ¸ in
(27) and solving for gi yield
gi = ¡(2n¡ 1)xij + (1 + 2n)C
0
2n
< 0; (28)
10Equivalently, since @(xkii=(x
k
ii+x
k
ij))=(¡@gi) = ¡Áki ; the variable also measures the correspond-
ing fall in the share of domestic sales.
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which is identical to the expression we found under the SA tax system, c.f. equation
(14). At …rst glance this may seem a bit surprising, since it shows that the transfer
price is independent of the tax system in use. However, it simply re‡ects the fact
that when tax rates are identical (ti = tj), only the strategic motive is driving the
transfer pricing behavior of the …rm:
Since transfer prices are the same regardless of tax regime, it also follows that the
impact of economic integration (reduced trade costs) on transfer prices and exports,
dgki =d¿ and dxij=d¿ ; is the same regardless of whether we consider the SA or FA.
From equations (16) and (17) we thus know that the quantity sold by the subsidiary
in the foreign market is decreasing in ¿ , while the transfer price is an increasing
function of ¿ .
Stage 1: The optimal choice of tax rates
The welfare level in country i is
W FAi = max
ti
©
CSi + TR
FA
i
ª
; (29)
where consumer surplus is still given by (18), and tax revenue equals
TRFAi = ti
·
xii
xii + xij
ni¼
G
i +
xji
xjj + xji
nj¼
G
j
¸
: (30)
The government in each country thus maximizes (29) subject to (26). In or-
der to illustrate the solution to this maximization problem, we will again use the
method of examining how sensitive the transfer prices are to changes in the tax
rates. Di¤erentiating equation (26) around ti = tj we …nd that
@gi
@ti
= ¡Á (1 + 2n)
2
[(1 + 2n)2C 00 + 4n)]
< 0 (31)
and
@gi
@tj
= Á
(1 + 2n)2
[(1 + 2n)2C 00 + 4n)]
> 0: (32)
We see that the signs of @gi=@ti and @gi=@tj are the same under the two tax systems:
a higher tax rate in one country encourage …rms to use the transfer price as a device
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to shift pro…t to the other country. However, we have already seen that Á is an
increasing function of ¿ ; and from equations (31) and (32) we can therefore deduce
that:
PROPOSITION 3: Under Formula Apportionment, other things being equal,
transfer prices are less tax sensitive the lower the level of trade costs.
This result is the opposite of what we found under the SA system, and is related
to the tax elasticity of the transfer price. If the transfer price is highly tax elastic
it is very e¤ective as a pro…t shifting device. The e¤ectiveness of the transfer price
as a pro…t shifting device is given by Á; which gives the impact of a change in the
transfer price on the apportionment of pro…ts across countries. From (25), (31) and
(32), it is seen that a change in the transfer price has a signi…cant impact on Á if
the foreign subsidiary’s share of total sales initially is small, in which case a given
change in gi (and thus in xij) has a large e¤ect on the relative sales abroad. This is
true for high levels of trade costs. On the other hand, for low levels of trade costs,
the foreign subsidiary’s share does not change very much in response to a change
in the transfer price. Therefore the tax gain from changing the transfer price is also
small, implying that gi is relatively insensitive to changes in either of the tax rates.
Economic integration thus reduces the e¢ciency of using the transfer price as an
instrument for pro…t shifting, and there is an inverse relationship between trade
costs and equilibrium taxes:
PROPOSITION 4: Under Formula Apportionment, other things being equal,
equilibrium tax rates are higher the lower the level of trade costs.
Proposition 2 is illustrated by the downward-sloping tax curve in Figure 3, which
is found by solving (29) numerically.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium tax rates under Formula Apportionment
5 Concluding remarks
This paper explores the interaction between corporate taxation, transfer pricing and
welfare. We show that the relationship between these factors depends on degree of
economic integration and the choice of tax regime.
One important result that emerges is that the e¤ect of increased economic in-
tegration on equilibrium taxes depends crucially on the tax regime in force. While
under SA increased economic integration leads to lower tax revenue, the opposite
is true under FA. To make a full welfare assessment it should be noted that eco-
nomic integration under any tax regime a¤ects consumer surplus positively due to
enhanced competition leading to lower prices and larger quantities sold. Thus, under
SA we have two opposing e¤ects of increased integration; rising consumer surplus
and falling tax rates. In contrast, with FA, consumer surplus and tax rates rise. Fig-
ure 4 indicates that an SA regime provides the highest welfare level for a low degree
of integration (high trade costs), while the FA regime becomes more attractive as
integration proceeds. Thus, for a high degree of economic integration, the FA regime
may come to dominate the SA regime from a welfare perspective.
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Figure 4: Welfare comparison; SA versus FA
To conclude, we …nd that the impact of increased economic integration on the
intensity of international tax competition hinges on the choice of tax regime. Under
Separate accounting increased integration leads to intensi…ed tax competition, while
under Formula apportionment increased integration actually reduces the intensity
of tax competition. These relationships are mirrored in the relationship between
economic integration and welfare under the two di¤erent tax regimes. In terms of
national welfare, the SA system dominates for low degrees of integration, while
the FA system becomes dominating as an integration process proceeds. Hence, our
results support the view brought forward by many other economists11 that increased
economic integration may call for a substantial reform of the corporate tax system.
6 Appendix
Derivation of equations (21) and (22).
By di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition in equation (12) with respect to ti we
11See, e.g. Musgrave (1973), Bird and Brennan (1986), McLure (1989), Bucks and Mazerov
(1993) and Shakelford and Slemrod (1998).
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…nd
¡(xkij ¡ ¸gki ¡ C 0) + (1¡ ti)
Ã
@xkij
@gki
¡ ¸¡ C 00
!
@gki
@ti
¡ (1¡ tj)2¸
@xkij
@gki
@gki
@ti
= 0:
(33)
Note from equation (12) that around ti = tj we have
xkij ¡ ¸gki ¡ C 0 = 2¸xkij : (34)
Inserting for (34) into (33), and using that ¸ = 2n=(1+2n), we …nd (21). Equation
(22), and the corresponding expressions under the FA tax regime, are found in a
similar way.
Parameter values employed in the numerical simulations:
® = 5; ch = cf = 0; nh = nf = 1
Concealment function: C(gi) = 2g2i :
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